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2023-12-26-Prusa-is-floundering.md (9164B)


  1. ---
  2. title: Why Prusa is floundering, and how you can avoid their fate
  3. date: 2023-12-26
  4. ---
  5. Prusa is a 3D printer manufacturer which has a long history of being admired by
  6. the 3D printing community for high quality, open source printers. They have been
  7. struggling as of late, and came under criticism for making the firmware of their
  8. Mk4 printer non-free.[^correction]
  9. [Armin Ronacher][0] uses Prusa as a case-study in why open source companies
  10. fail, and uses this example to underline his argument that open source needs to
  11. adapt for commercial needs, namely by adding commercial exclusivity clauses to
  12. its licenses -- Armin is one of the principal proponents of the non-free
  13. Functional Source License. Armin cites his experience with a Chinese
  14. manufactured 3D printer as evidence that intellectual property is at the heart
  15. of Prusa's decline, and goes on to discuss how this dynamic applies to his own
  16. work in developing a non-free license for use with Sentry. I find this work
  17. pretty interesting -- FSL is a novel entry into the non-free license compendium,
  18. and it's certainly a better way to do software than proprietary models, assuming
  19. that it's not characterized as free or open source. But, allow me to use the
  20. same case study to draw different conclusions.
  21. [0]: https://lucumr.pocoo.org/2023/12/25/life-and-death-of-open-source/
  22. It is clear on the face of it that Prusa's move to a non-free firmware is
  23. unrelated to their struggles with the Chinese competition -- their firmware was
  24. GPL'd, and the cited competitor (Bambu) evidently respects copyleft, and there's
  25. no evidence that Bambu's printers incorporate derivatives of Prusa's firmware in
  26. a manner which violates the GPL. Making the license non-free is immaterial to
  27. the market dynamics between Prusa and Bambu, so the real explanation must lie
  28. elsewhere.
  29. If you had asked me 10 years ago what I expected Prusa's largest risk would be,
  30. I would have simply answered "China" and you would have probably said the same.
  31. The Chinese economy and industrial base can outcompete Western manufacturing in
  32. almost every manufacturing market.[^china] This was always the obvious
  33. vulnerability in their business model, and they *absolutely* needed to be
  34. prepared for this situation, or their death was all but certain. Prusa made one
  35. of the classic errors in open source business models: they made their product,
  36. made it open source, sold it, and assumed that they were done working on their
  37. business model.
  38. [^china]: That said, there are still vulnerabilities in the Chinese industrial
  39. base that can be exploited by savvy Western entrepreneurs. Chinese access to
  40. Western markets is constrained below a certain scale, for instance, in ways
  41. that Western businesses are not.
  42. It was inevitable that someday Chinese manufacturers would undercut Prusa on
  43. manufacturing costs. Prusa responded to this certainty by not diversifying their
  44. business model whatsoever. There has only ever been one Prusa product: their
  45. latest 3D printer model. The Mk4 costs $1,200. You can buy the previous
  46. generation (at $1,000), or the MINI (from 2019, $500). You can open your wallet
  47. and get their high-end printers, which are neat but fail to address the one
  48. thing that most users at this price-point really want, which is more build
  49. volume. Or, you can buy an Ender 3 off Amazon right now for $180 and you'll get
  50. better than half of the value of an Mk4 at an 85% discount. You could also buy
  51. Creality's flagship model for a cool $800 and get a product which beats the Mk4
  52. in every respect. China has joined the market, bringing with them all of the
  53. competitive advantages their industrial base can bring to bear, and Prusa's
  54. naive strategy is causing their position to fall like a rock.
  55. Someone new to 3D printing will pick up an Ender and will probably be happy with
  56. it for 1-2 years. When they upgrade, will they upgrade to a Prusa or an Ender 5?
  57. Three to five years a customer spends in someone else's customer pipeline is an
  58. incredibly expensive opportunity cost Prusa is missing out on. This opportunity
  59. cost is the kind of arithmetic that would make loss leaders like a cheap,
  60. low-end, low-or-negative-margin Prusa printer make financial sense. Hell, Prusa
  61. should have made a separate product line of white-labeled Chinese entry-level 3D
  62. printers just to get people on the Prusa brand.
  63. Prusa left many stones unturned. Bambu's cloud slicer is a massive lost
  64. opportunity for Prusa. On-demand cloud printing services are another lost
  65. opportunity. Prusa could have built a marketplace for models & parts and skimmed
  66. a margin off of the top, but they waited until 2022 to launch Printables --
  67. waiting until the 11th hour when everyone was fed up with Thingiverse. Imagine a
  68. Prusa where it works out of the box, you can fire up a slicer in your browser
  69. which auto-connects to your printer and prints models from a Prusa-operated
  70. model repository, paying $10 for a premium model, $1 off the top goes to Prusa,
  71. with the same saved payment details which ensure that a fresh spool of Prusa
  72. filament arrives at your front door when it auto-detects that your printer is
  73. almost out. The print you want is too big for your build volume? Click here to
  74. have it cloud printed -- do you want priority shipping for that? Your hot-end is
  75. reaching the end of its life -- as one of our valued business customers on our
  76. premium support contract we would be happy to send you a temporary replacement
  77. printer while yours is shipped in for service.
  78. Prusa's early foothold in the market was strong, and they were wise to execute
  79. the way they did early on. But they *absolutely* had to diversify their lines of
  80. business. Prusa left gaping holes in the market and utterly failed to capitalize
  81. on any of them. Prusa could have been synonymous with 3D printing if they had
  82. invested in the brand (though they probably needed a better name). I should be
  83. able to walk into a Best Buy and pick up an entry-level Prusa for $250-$500, or
  84. into a Home Depot and pick up a workshop model for $1000-$2000. I should be able
  85. to bring it home, unbox it, scan a QR code to register it with PrusaConnect, and
  86. have a Benchy printing in less than 10 minutes.
  87. Chinese manufacturers did all of this and more, and they're winning. They aren't
  88. just cheaper -- they offer an outright better product. These are not cheap
  89. knock-offs: if you want the best 3D printer today it's going to be a Chinese
  90. one, regardless of how much you want to spend, but, as it happens, you're going
  91. to spend less.
  92. Note that none of this is material to the license of the product, be it free or
  93. non-free. It's about building a brand, developing a customer relationship, and
  94. identifying and exploiting market opportunities. Hackers and enthusiasts who
  95. found companies like Prusa tend to imagine that the product is everything, but
  96. it's not. Maybe 10% of the work is developing the 3D printer itself --
  97. don't abandon the other 90% of your business. Especially when you make that 10%
  98. open: someone else is going to repurpose it, do the other 90%, and eat your
  99. lunch. FOSS is *great* precisely because it makes that 10% into community
  100. property and shares the cost of innovation, but you'd be a fool to act as if
  101. that was all there was to it. You need to deal with sales and marketing, chase
  102. down promising leads, identify and respond to risks, look for and exploit new
  103. market opportunities, and much more to be successful.
  104. This is a classic failure mode of open source businesses, and it's *Prusa's
  105. fault*. They had an excellent foothold early in the market, leveraging open
  106. source and open hardware to great results and working hand-in-hand with
  107. enthusiasts early on to develop the essential technology of 3D printing. Then,
  108. they figured they were done developing their business model, and completely
  109. dropped the ball as a result. Open source is not an "if you build it, the money
  110. will come" situation, and to think otherwise is a grave mistake. Businesses need
  111. to identify their risks and then mitigate them, and if they don't do that due
  112. diligence, then it's *their fault* when it fails -- it's not a problem with
  113. FOSS.
  114. Free and open source software is an incredibly powerful tool, including as a
  115. commercial opportunity. FOSS really has changed the world! But building a
  116. business is still hard, and in addition to its fantastic advantages, the FOSS
  117. model poses important and challenging constraints that you need to understand
  118. and work with. You have to be creative, and you must do a risk/reward assessment
  119. to understand how it applies to your business and how you can utilize it for
  120. commercial success. Do the legwork and you can utilize FOSS for a competitive
  121. advantage, but skip this step and you will probably fail within a decade.
  122. [^correction]: I sourced this information from Armin's blog post, but it didn't
  123. hold up to a later fact check: the
  124. [Mk4 firmware](https://github.com/prusa3d/Prusa-Firmware-Buddy) seems to be
  125. free software. It seems the controversy here has to do with Prusa
  126. developing its slicer software behind closed doors and doing occasional
  127. source-code dumps, rather than managing a more traditional "bazaar" style
  128. project.