logo

drewdevault.com

[mirror] blog and personal website of Drew DeVault git clone https://hacktivis.me/git/mirror/drewdevault.com.git

2023-01-30-Should-private-platforms-engage-in-censorship.md (11743B)


  1. ---
  2. title: Should private platforms engage in censorship?
  3. date: 2023-01-30
  4. ---
  5. Private service providers are entitled to do business with whom they please, or
  6. not to. Occasionally, a platform will take advantage of this to deny service to
  7. a particular entity on any number of grounds, often igniting a flood of debate
  8. online regarding whether or not censorship in this form is just. Recently,
  9. CloudFlare pulled the plug on a certain forum devoted to the coordinated
  10. harassment of its victims. Earlier examples include the same service blocking a
  11. far-right imageboard, or Namecheap cancelling service for a neo-Nazi news site.
  12. In each of these cases, a private company elected to terminate service for a
  13. customer voluntarily, without a court order. Absent from these events was any
  14. democratic or judicial oversight. A private company which provides some kind of
  15. infrastructure for the Internet simply elected to unilaterally terminate service
  16. for a customer or class of customers.
  17. When private companies choose with whom they do or do not do business with, this
  18. is an exercise of an important freedom: [freedom of association][assoc]. Some
  19. companies have this right limited by regulation — for instance, utility
  20. companies are often required to provide power to everyone who wants it within
  21. their service area. Public entities are required to provide their services to
  22. everyone — for instance, the US postal service cannot unilaterally choose
  23. not to deliver your mail. However, by default, private companies are generally
  24. allowed to deny their services to whomever they please.[^1]
  25. [assoc]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_association
  26. [^1]: There are some nuances omitted here, such as the implications of the DMCA
  27. "safe harbor" provisions.
  28. Are they right to?
  29. An argument is often made that, when a platform reaches a given size (e.g.
  30. Facebook), or takes on certain ambitions (e.g. CloudFlare), it may become large
  31. and entrenched enough in our society that it should self-impose a role more
  32. analogous to a public utility than a private company. Under such constraints,
  33. such a platform would choose to host any content which is not explicitly
  34. illegal, and defer questions over what content is appropriate to the democratic
  35. process. There are a number of angles from which we can examine this argument.
  36. For a start, how might we implement the scenario called for by this argument?
  37. Consider one option: regulation. Power companies are subject to regulations
  38. regarding how and with whom they do business; they must provide service to
  39. everyone and they are not generally allowed to shut off your heat in the cold
  40. depths of winter. Similarly, we could regulate digital platforms to require them
  41. to provide a soapbox for all legally expressible viewpoints, then utilize the
  42. democratic process to narrow this soapbox per society's mutually-agreed-upon
  43. views regarding matters such as neo-Nazi propaganda.[^2]
  44. [^2]: Arguments on other issues also call for regulating digital platforms, such
  45. as addressing the impact that being binned by Google without recourse can have
  46. on your quality-of-life for users who are dependent on Google's email
  47. services. Some nuance is called for; I will elaborate on this in future posts.
  48. It's important when making this argument to note that regulation of this sort
  49. imposes obligations on private businesses which erode their own right to free
  50. association; radical free speech for individuals requires radical curtailing of
  51. free association for businesses. Private businesses are owned and staffed by
  52. individuals, and requiring them to allow all legal forms of content on their
  53. platform is itself a limitation on their freedom. The staff of a newspaper may
  54. not appreciate being required by law to provide space in the editorials for KKK
  55. members to espouse their racist philosophy, but would nevertheless be required
  56. to typeset such articles under such an arrangement.
  57. Another approach to addressing this argument is not to question the rights of a
  58. private business, but instead to question whether or not they should be allowed
  59. to grow to a size such that their discretion in censorship constitutes a
  60. disruption to society due to their scale and entrenched market position. Under
  61. this lens, we can suggest another government intervention that does not take the
  62. form of regulation, but of an application of antitrust law. With more platforms
  63. to choose from, we can explore more approaches to moderation and censorship, and
  64. depend on the market's invisible hand to lead us true.
  65. The free speech absolutist who makes similar arguments may find themselves in a
  66. contradiction: expanding free speech for some people (platform users) requires,
  67. in this scenario, curtailing freedoms for others (platform owners and staff).
  68. Someone in this position may concede that, while they support the rights of
  69. individuals, they might not offer the same rights to businesses who resemble
  70. utilities. The tools for implementing this worldview, however, introduce further
  71. contradictions when combined with the broader political profile of a typical
  72. free speech absolutist: calling for regulation isn't very consistent with any
  73. "small government" philosophy; and those who describe themselves as Libertarian
  74. and make either of these arguments provide me with no small amount of amusement.
  75. There is another flaw in this line of thinking which I want to highlight: the
  76. presumption that the democratic process can address these problems in the first
  77. place. Much of the legitimacy of this argument rests on the assumption that the
  78. ability for maligned users to litigate their grievances is not only more just,
  79. but also equal to the threat posed by hate speech and other concerns which are
  80. often the target of censorship on private platforms. I don't think that this is
  81. true.
  82. The democratic and judicial processes are often corrupt and inefficient. It is
  83. still the case that the tone of your skin has an outsized effect on the outcome
  84. of your court case; why shouldn't similar patterns emerge when de-platformed
  85. racists are given their day before a judge? Furthermore, the pace of government
  86. interventions are generally insufficient. Could Facebook appeal a court for the
  87. right to remove the Proud Boys from their platform faster than they could
  88. organize an attack on the US Capitol building? And can lawmakers keep up with
  89. innovation at a pace sufficient to address new forms and mediums for
  90. communicating harmful content before they're a problem?
  91. We should also question if the democratic process will lead to moral outcomes.
  92. Minorities are, by definition, in the minority, and a purely democratic process
  93. will only favor their needs subject to the will of the majority. Should the
  94. rights of trans people to live free of harassment be subject to the pleasure of
  95. the cisgendered majority?
  96. These systems, when implemented, will perform as they always have: they will
  97. provide disproportionately unfavorable outcomes for disadvantaged members of
  98. society. I am a leftist: if asked to imagine a political system which addresses
  99. these problems, I will first imagine sweeping reforms to our existing system,
  100. point out that the free market isn't, lean in favor of regulation and
  101. nationalization of important industries, and seek to empower the powerless
  102. against the powerful. It will require a lot of difficult, ongoing work to get
  103. there, and I imagine most of this work will be done in spite of the protests of
  104. the typical free speech absolutist.
  105. I am in favor of these reforms, but they are decades away from completion, and
  106. many will disagree on the goals and their implementation. But I am also a
  107. pragmatic person, and when faced with the system in which we find ourselves
  108. today, I seek a pragmatic solution to this problem; ideally one which is not
  109. predicated on revolution. When faced with the question, "should private
  110. platforms engage in censorship?", what is the pragmatic answer?
  111. To provide such an answer, we must de-emphasize idealism in favor of an honest
  112. examination of the practical context within which our decision-making is done.
  113. Consider again the status quo: private companies are generally permitted to
  114. exercise their right to free association by kicking people off of their
  115. platforms. A pragmatic framework for making these decisions examines the context
  116. in which they are made. In the current political climate, this context should
  117. consider the threats faced by many different groups of marginalized people
  118. today: racism is still alive and strong, what few LGBT rights exist are being
  119. dismantled, and many other civil liberties are under attack.
  120. When someone (or some entity such as business) enjoys a particular freedom, the
  121. way they exercise it is meaningful. Inaction is a form of complicity; allowing
  122. hate to remain on your platform is an acknowledgement of your favor towards the
  123. lofty principles outlined in the arguments above *in spite of* the problems
  124. enumerated here and the realities faced by marginalized people today. A purely
  125. moral consideration thus suggests that exercising your right to free association
  126. in your role as a decision-maker at a business is a just response to this status
  127. quo.
  128. I expect the people around me (given a definition of "around me" that extends to
  129. the staff at businesses I patronize) to possess a moral compass which is
  130. compatible with my own, and to act in accordance with it; in the absence of this
  131. I will express my discontent by voting with my feet. However, businesses in the
  132. current liberal economic regime often disregard morals in favor of
  133. profit-oriented decision making. Therefore, in order for the typical business
  134. behave morally, their decision-making must exist within a context where the
  135. moral outcomes align with the profitable outcomes.
  136. We are seeing increasing applications of private censorship because this
  137. alignment is present. Businesses depend on two economic factors which are
  138. related to this issue: access to a pool of profitable users, and access to a
  139. labor pool with which to develop and maintain their profits. Businesses which
  140. platform bigots are increasingly finding public opinion turning against them;
  141. marginalized people and moderates tend to flee to less toxic spaces and staff
  142. members are looking to greener pastures. The free market currently rewards
  143. private censorship, therefore in a system wherein the free market reigns supreme
  144. we observe private censorship.
  145. I reject the idea that it is appropriate for businesses to sideline morality in
  146. favor of profit, and I don't have much faith in the free market to produce moral
  147. outcomes. For example, the market is responding poorly to the threat of climate
  148. change. However, in the case of private censorship, the incentives are aligned
  149. such that the outcomes we're observing match the outcomes I would expect.
  150. This is a complex topic which we have examined from many angles. In my view,
  151. freedom of association is just as important as freedom of speech, and its
  152. application to private censorship is not clearly wrong. If you view private
  153. censorship as an infringement of the principle of free speech, but agree that
  154. freedom of association is nevertheless important, we must resolve this
  155. contradiction. The democratic or judicial processes are an enticing and
  156. idealistic answer, but these are flawed processes that may not produce just
  157. outcomes. If I were to consider these tools to address this question, I'm going
  158. to present solutions from a socialist perspective which may or may not jibe with
  159. your sensibilities.
  160. Nevertheless, the system as it exists today produces outcomes which approximate
  161. both rationality and justice, and I do not stand in opposition to the increased
  162. application of private censorship under the current system, flawed though it may
  163. be.